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THE HAMILTON BANK DECISION:
REGULATORY INVERSE
CONDEMNATION CLAIMS ENCOUNTER
SOME NEW OBSTACLES
R. MARLIN SMITH*
When the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the deci-
sion of the Sixth Circuit in Hamilton Bank of Johnson County v. Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Commission' it appeared that the
Court would finally have an opportunity to settle definitively the ques-
tion of whether the Constitution requires that compensation be paid
when a regulation is so severe that it amounts to a "taking."2 It was
* Partner, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, Illinois.
1. 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984).
2. In two previous instances the Court concluded that the record did not permit it
to reach the issue. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court held the
restrictions to be facially valid, but declined to reach the question of validity as applied
because plaintiff had not sought approval of a specific development as required by the
Tiburon ordinance. In San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981), the Court found there had not been a final judgement in the California state
courts, thus the issue was not ripe.
Regulation results in a taking when it "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land." Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a taking
occurs when regulation "goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). How far regulation may legitimately "go" will vary with the facts, the times,
and the jurisprudential disposition of the Court. In an opinion that preceded Penn-
sylvania Coal by fourteen years, Holmes had said that when regulation makes property
"wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over the other public interest, and
the police power would fail. To set such a limit would need compensation and the power
of eminent domain." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)
(emphasis supplied). Under this approach, regulation is a "taking" whenever the object
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not to be. Although a jury had decided that the land use regulations of
the Commission did amount to a "temporary taking" and had set com-
pensation at $350,000, the Supreme Court, in Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson County,3
again avoided a direct confrontation with the claim that when regula-
tion deprives a landowner of all reasonably viable economic use of his
land, either permanently or temporarily, then compensation must be
paid. About all that is clear from the opinion in Hamilton Bank is that
the Court does not intend to permit regulatory taking claims for com-
pensation to become routine weaponry in the arsenal of landowners
and developers. However, more of that later. First, the setting in
which the dispute between the Bank and the Commission arose.
I. THE FACTS
The train of events that culminated in the decision of the Supreme
Court was set off by an everyday occurrence in local government. The
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission refused to approve
a final plat of subdivision that Hamilton Bank had submitted. How-
ever, eight years of history preceded that simple act.4
In 1973 William Temple owned and farmed the property which the
Bank ultimately came to own. A group of developers formed a joint
venture to build a residential subdivision on the Temple property. Part
of the property was on relatively steep slopes and presented some de-
velopmental complications that prevented the application of orthodox
subdivision techniques. Thus, the developers of what was to become
Temple Hills Country Club Estates proposed to the county that they be
permitted to plat the land as a residential clustered subdivision in
which houses would be built on comparatively small lots while other
sought by government can only be achieved by exercising the power of eminent domain.
Many believe that Justice Holmes' characterization of unreasonably restrictive regula-
tion as a "taking" was simply a use of the term as a convenient metaphor for regulation
that is beyond the reach of the police power. The purpose of this article, however, is not
to argue that point again. The author, together with his professional colleagues Richard
Babcock, Daniel Mandlelker, Charles Siemon, and Norman Williams, Jr. made that
point elsewhere. See Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker, Babcock, The White River
Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. LAW REv. 193 (1984). See also Fred F. French Investment
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385
(1976).
3. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
4. The facts are drawn from the Court's opinion, the briefs of the parties, and the
amicus brief of the Solicitor General of the United States.
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land in the subdivision was retained as open space. The idea was a new
one for Williamson County and required an amendment of the zoning
ordinance. After considerable study, the county adopted the amend-
ment. The new "cluster" amendment provided that density could not
exceed the one dwelling unit per acre limit allowed by the zoning ordi-
nance, required the exclusion from the density computation of one-half
of all land that was on a slope with a grade of more than 25 percent,
and prohibited the construction of houses on steep slopes and other
areas deemed unbuildable.
The developers then prepared and submitted to the Commission a
preliminary plat of Temple Hills that showed a total project area of 676
acres, 416 of which would be developed with residences. The remain-
ing 260 acres were to be left as open space, with a golf course occupy-
ing 245 of those acres. In the grand tradition of optimism that is
endemic to the development community, the joint venture proposed to
build more residences than the market could absorb either immediately
or in the near future. Consequently, although the preliminary plat
bore a notation that the "allowable" number of dwelling units was 736,
the plat contained lot lines for only 469 dwelling units on 287 of the
416 acres that were designated for residential development. The re-
maining 129 acres were left blank on the plat and contained the legend
"this parcel not to be developed until approved by the planning com-
mission." There was a further caution on the plat that parcels contain-
ing that legend were "not a part of the plat and are not included in
gross area." 5 The Commission approved the Temple Hills preliminary
plat in May of 1973. Despite the approval, the preliminary plat may
have conflicted with a provision in the 1973 amendment to the zoning
ordinance that required the deduction from total acreage of 50 percent
of all land on slopes with a grade of more than 25 percent.
5. This caveat introduced an element of uncertainty because the 736 unit total was
computed by multiplying the entire gross acreage of the tract by the allowable number
of dwelling units per acre. In~identally, dwelling units divided by acreage, yields a fac-
tor of 1.089, which seemed to have exceeded the maximum allowable density. See Mer-
riam, Caught in the Takings Muddle: Legally We've Been Had, 51 Plan. 23, 24-25
(1985), for a copy of the Temple Hills development plan and a map of the area's topog-
raphy. The present County Planner concedes that subdivision review in Williamson
County in the early 1970s left much to be desired. He also states that although the staff
report and minutes did not indicate that the proposed Temple Hills development would
violate zoning and subdivision regulations, an after-the-fact review disclosed otherwise.
See Stein, Caught in the Takings Muddle: On the Road to the Supreme Court, 51 Plan.
23, 27 (1985). Stein also concedes that by the time the Bank took over the property, the
Planning Commission was pursuing a no growth policy. Id. at 29.
1985]
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Time passed. The developers gave the county a permanent open
space easement on the golf course. They built roads. They installed
utility lines. They spent $3 million on the golf course and $500,000 on
water and sewer facilities. 212 houses were built, leaving, presumably,
524 still to be built. Final subdivision plats were submitted and ap-
proved by the Commission before construction began in those sections
of Temple Hills in which the houses were built. Arithmetically, only
257 of the remaining 524 units could be accommodated on the 469 lots
shown on the preliminary plat. The balance of 267 units would have to
go some place on the 129 acres on which no lot lines were shown on
the 1973 preliminary plat.
In 1974 and again in 1975, the developers slightly revised the prelim-
inary plat and the Commission reapproved it. The developers did not
seek reapproval of the preliminary plat in 1976 and 1977, apparently
because of some economic difficulty that the development was exper-
* 6iencing. However, in 1978 and 1979, the Commission reapproved a
preliminary plat that was essentially similar to the 1973 plat despite the
fact that the plat conflicted with some amendments to the zoning ordi-
nance that had been adopted in 1977. Among those was a requirement
that in computing allowable density 10 percent of the total area must
be deducted for roads.
Meanwhile, in refinancing the project, a single individual took over
the development and the Hamilton Bank emerged as the sole mortga-
gee holding a $2.4 million mortgage. Hard times hit the residential
development industry in 1978 and 1979, and the developer defaulted
on the mortgage. In November of 1980, Hamilton Bank bid in the
remaining 257.6 acres at a sheriff's sale for $1.75 million, or $1.12 mil-
lion less than the mortgage debt.7 However, the Bank took over the
property only after the developer had secured a ruling from the County
Zoning Board of Appeals that the 1973 regulations governed the devel-
opment of Temple Hills.
Before folding his tent the developer had, in October of 1980, sought
preliminary plat approval for 548 dwelling units. The Commission re-
fused to approve the plat because, in calculating density, the developer
6. The county required annual reapproval of any portions of a preliminary plat for
which final plats had yet to be approved. The 1978 and 1979 reapprovals by the county
seem to have waived any consequences that might have resulted from the developers'
failure to secure reapproval in 1975 and 1976.
7. The total indebtedness, including accrued interest, was $2.87 million. Amicus
Brief, Solicitor General, supra note 4, at 6.
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had not deducted 10 percent of the land for roads, 50 percent of the
land with a slope of more than 25 percent and 18.5 acres that had been
taken by eminent domain for a parkway. In addition, some proposed
lots would be located on slopes of more than 25 percent. The Bank, as
the new owner, tried again in June of 1981 with that plat and with a
new one that would have permitted a total of 688 dwelling units. Both
were turned down for the same three reasons plus a collection of new
ones, including that two cul-de-sacs exceeded the maximum permitted
length, some road grades exceeded the maximum allowed in the county
regulations, and the proposed lots did not comply with the lot size and
frontage requirements in the 1980 subdivision regulations. So the Bank
sued, filing in the federal court, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982).
II. THE LITIGATION
The Bank asserted that the Commission's regulations deprived it of
due process and equal protection, took its property without compensa-
tion, and that, as a matter of state law, the Commission was estopped
from retroactively applying the new regulations to the Temple Hills
development. The Bank claimed that it was entitled, and had been
deprived of the right, to build 476 dwelling units. The Bank arrived at
this number of units by subtracting from the 736 units approved in
1973 the 212 units that had already been built and the 48 units that
were attributable to the part of the tract that had been condemned for
the Natchez Trace Parkway and for which compensation had been
paid.
The testimony at trial was apparently conflicting. One of the Bank's
witnesses testified that the new regulations imposed by the Commission
eliminated 409 potential building sites, leaving only 67 scattered sites
available for development, which he said would result in a $1 million
loss if the project was completed. Another witness testified that the
Bank had been unable to sell the property because no one was inter-
ested in purchasing property that could only be developed by sus-
taining a $1 million loss. On the other hand, the County Engineer
testified that he had redesigned the subdivision in a manner that would
permit its development with about 300 lots.
The credibility issue was settled by the jury who found that the Bank
had been deprived of any economically viable use of its land and that
the Commission's regulations had "taken" the land in violation of the
Bank's constitutionally protected rights. The jury assessed damages in
1985]
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the amount of $350,000 for a "temporary taking" from the date of plat
disapproval to the date of judgment.' The jury also found that, under
Tennessee law, the Commission was estopped from applying the cur-
rent zoning regulations instead of the 1973 regulations. On the
strength of that finding, the trial judge enjoined the Commission from
applying anything other than the 1973 regulations to the Bank's prop-
erty. The trial court also set aside the damage verdict, reasoning that
as a result of the estoppel verdict there had been only a temporary
interference with the Bank's property. The court ruled that such a
temporary interference did not constitute a taking for which compensa-
tion was required because any damages the Bank sustained resulted
from an attempt by the Commission to apply land use regulations in a
manner that was not permitted by state law.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment setting aside the damage
verdict and reinstated the $350,000 verdict.9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The only issue presented to the Supreme Court was
whether it was error for the court of appeals to rule that compensation
must be paid for the temporary taking of the Bank's property during
the period that it was prevented from proceeding with development.
III. THE OPINION: A FIRST READING
Once more the opportunity to deal definitively with a regulatory in-
verse condemnation case eluded the Court. This time it was because
the Court became persuaded that in the context of the dispute between
the Bank and the Planning Commission it was premature to consider
whether government is required to compensate landowners who are
able to establish that their property has been taken temporarily by the
application of governmental regulations. The Court found itself unable
to reach that question because a majority of the justices believed that
the dispute was not ripe for judicial review. The question of whether
the Bank's attempt to secure compensation was premature was injected
into the appeal by the United States Solicitor General who filed an
amicus brief in support of the Commission's effort to reverse the deci-
sion of the Sixth Circuit. Much of the Solicitor General's brief was
devoted to the argument that the litigation was premature.10 Rather
8. The briefs of the parties do not make it clear what testimony the damage award
rested on.
9. 729 F.2d at 409.
10. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 12-
17, Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/2
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plainly the argument was persuasive.
The Court's conclusion that the Bank's inverse condemnation claim
was premature rested on two findings. First, the Court ruled that the
Bank had not obtained a final decision regarding the application of the
zoning and subdivision regulations to its property. Second, the Court
said that the Bank had not utilized the procedures that were available
under Tennessee law for obtaining compensation. Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the case was not ripe for review
because there was no certainty that the Commission would refuse to
permit either the development that the Bank had sought or any other
economically viable use of the property. Observing that it would have
been possible for the Board of Zoning Appeals to grant variances with
respect to at least five of the eight objections that the Planning Com-
mission had to the proposed subdivision plat, and that the Bank had
not sought those variances, Justice Blackmun said that there had not
been a final determination that the regulations which were claimed to
result in a taking of the Bank's property would in fact be the restric-
tions that would actually be applied to the development of the land.
In reaching this conclision it was necessary for the Court to distin-
guish between its determination that the dispute was not ripe for judi-
cial review and the question of whether the Bank had failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies. In Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents,1 1 the
Court had held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff in a Section
1983 damage action to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit. The Bank had brought its claim under Section 1983 and argued
that it was not necessary under the Patsy decision for it to pursue any
administrative remedies that might be available. The Court distin-
guished the Patsy decision by saying that it simply held that a Section
1983 plaintiff is not required to resort to remedial procedures designed
to review the lawfulness or correctness of an otherwise final adminis-
trative action. In contrast, in this case resort to the variance procedure
was necessary in order to have a conclusive determination with respect
to whether the Bank would be permitted to develop its subdivision in
the manner it proposed.12 The Patsy decision did not apply because
3108 (1985). The interest of the Solicitor General undoubtedly was founded upon a
concern that a ruling requiring compensation might imperil important federal environ-
mental regulation programs.
11. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
12. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 749
(1975), the Court declined to consider whether the application of the federal surface
mining law and regulations effected a "taking" because the plaintiffs did not utilize the
19851
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the Commission's denial of plat approval did not, according to the
Court, permit a conclusive determination with respect to whether the
Bank had been denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property.
The Court also ruled that the Bank's federal taking claim was not
ripe for judicial review because it had not utilized the state procedures
that were available for securing compensation.13 The Court noted that
the fifth amendment does not forbid the taking of property; it just for-
bids taking property without just compensation. So, as the Court ex-
plained in a footnote, it is not possible to say that a violation of the fifth
amendment has occurred until it is clear that just compensation has
been denied to the property owner.14 The Court maintained that it
cannot be clear that there has been a constitutionally forbidden taking
until the property owner has utilized state created procedures for just
compensation and been denied compensation. 5 The Court found that
the Tennessee statutes permitted a property owner to bring an inverse
condemnation action to obtain compensation for an alleged taking of
property in some circumstances1 6 and that there were Tennessee deci-
sions interpreting the inverse condemnation statute as permitting a re-
opportunities afforded by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.
Under the Act, plaintiffs could have requested a waiver or a variance of the require-
ments they were challenging. The Solicitor General argued that Hodel required a party
to exhaust administrative remedies and to seek judicial review before pursuing just com-
pensation for a taking. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States, at 17. The Court
agreed with the first part of the Solicitor General's argument but transformed it into a
ripeness issue and disavowed any intent to require judicial review of the correctness of
the local decision as a prerequisite to an action for compensation.
13. The Court's opinion of the importance of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
is now apparent. Justice Blackmun found Parratt "analogous" because a due process
claim can not be established by simply alleging a deprivation of property resulting from
a random and unauthorized act of a state employee. The Constitution does not require
predeprivation process when it would be "impossible or impracticable to provide a
meaningful hearing." Due process is satisfied by a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.
So the constitutional rights of Mr. Parratt, a prisoner who had been deprived of $24
worth of hobby materials, had not been infringed because the Nebraska tort claims
statute provided a post-deprivation remedy.
14. 105 S. Ct. at 3121 n.13.
15. The Court adopted the same position that the Oregon Supreme Court took in
Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 656 P.2d 306 (Ore. 1982). In Suess Builders the
court held that a § 1983 taking claim could not ripen until the court decided the taking
claim under the Oregon Constitution because there was no federal constitutional right
of action under the fifth and fourteenth amendments unless state law failed to provide
compensation.
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-122 (1983) prohibits the state from "entering" con-
demned land until the state complies with statutory eminent domain procedures and the
state pays compensation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-123 (1983) authorizes a land-
[Vol. 29:3
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covery when restrictive zoning or development regulations amounted
to a taking. 7 The Bank had not shown that the Tennessee inverse
condemnation procedure was either unavailable or inadequate. Until
the Bank had done so and been rebuffed, the Court said its taking claim
was premature.
The Court did note the argument of the Planning Commission that a
regulation that is so restrictive that it has the same effect as a taking by
eminent domain is a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment because it is an unconstitutionally excessive exercise
of the police power. Under that theory, regulation that results in a
taking is simply an improper and invalid exercise of the police power
for which the remedy is invalidation of the offending regulation.18
Although the Court set out the arguments for and against this view, it
did not find it necessary to pass upon the merits of that debate. The
Court said that even if the issue were viewed as a question of due pro-
cess, the Bank's claim would still be premature because the effect of the
regulations could not be measured until there was a final decision as to
how the regulations would apply to the property.
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall filed a separate short opinion
concurring in the result but making it clear that they still adhered to
the views expressed in Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric v. City of San Diego. 9 Justice Stevens concurred in an opinion
that took issue with the views expressed by Justice Brennan in his San
Diego Gas dissent.2 ° Justice White dissented from the holding that the
owner to commence eminent domain proceedings when a governmental entity takes
possession of land without following the statutory procedures.
17. The Tennessee decisions on which the Court relied are Davis v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville, 620 S.W.2d 532, 533-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Speight v.
Lockhart, 524 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
18. See Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Supreme Court in
Agins did not consider the ruling of the California court that mandamus and declara-
tory judgment are the only remedies available to an aggrieved landowner. The Supreme
Court also did not consider whether a state may limit the remedies available to persons
whose land has been taken without compensation. The Hamilton Bank decision sug-
gests that the answer to the latter question is that a state may not impose such a
limitation.
19. 105 S. Ct. at 3124. See San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 636. For a description and
analysis of the Brennan dissent, see The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 2,
at 194-97. There is a perceptive critique of the Brennan dissent in Mandelker, Land Use
Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. 491 (1981).
20. 105 S. Ct. at 3125.
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issue was not ripe for decision.2"
IV. THE OPINION: SECOND THOUGHTS
The initial inference that a majority of the members of the Court
were not eager to try to formulate a general rule requiring compensa-
tion in taking cases has been made doubtful by the subsequent decision
of the Court to hear yet a fourth regulatory taking case.22 It now
seems more likely that the Court, or at least four members of it, would
like to find a vehicle for settling the regulatory taking controversy.
However, it is by no means certain that the members of the Court who
have been voting to grant review in inverse condemnation cases are of
one mind with respect to how the issue should be resolved. It is possi-
ble that four or more members of the Court agree that the temporary
regulatory taking issue should be addressed but do not agree that com-
pensation should be the remedy.
The result reached in Hamilton Bank was not inevitable. A plausi-
ble disposition could have been made of the threshold issues that frus-
21. Id. at 3124.
22. The Court's willingness to dispose of the Hamilton Bank dispute without reach-
ing the merits initially suggested that the Court may have been relieved to avoid grap-
pling with the main issue in the case. It also suggested that it might be some time before
the Court would again be presented with an inverse condemnation case that would
qualify a full review. But those assumptions already have been proven wrong. On Oc-
tober 21, 1985, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. County of Yolo and City of Davis, 106 U.S. 244 (1985), yet another case in which the
California state courts have declined to provide compensation as a remedy for a regula-
tory "taking." The Yolo County case burst upon the scene unexpectedly because there
was no previously reported decision. The trial court dismissed the complaint, the court
of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion and the California Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal. Jurisdictional Statement of Plaintiff, dated June 28, 1985, U.S. Supreme
Court Docket No. 84-2015.
Yolo County presents the following three issues: (1) Did placing land that is not
suitable for agricultural use in an agricultural zone and refusing to allow access to
streets or to provide sewage disposal, water service, or fire and police protection consti-
tute a taking?; (2) Does the fifth amendment mandate compensation for the time during
which the property was subject to the challenged restrictions?; (3) Did the state, by
limiting the property owner's remedy to a mandamus action, deprive the owner of an
adequate state remedy, thereby depriving him of both due process and rights protected
by § 1983. This is not the first time Supreme Court action has produced excited specu-
lation that the Court is searching for a case in which to settle the inverse condemnation
debate. The Court granted certiorari in San Diego Gas within a matter of days after the
Court filed the Agins decision. Those who three times have watched the Court charge
up to a confrontation with the regulatory taking dispute and then tiptoe away perhaps
can be excused if they are unable to generate the same level of eager anticipation that
they manifested on prior occasions.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/2
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trated a decision on the central issue. Unlike San Diego Gas, there was
no uncertainty with respect to the status of the determination by a jury
that a taking had in fact occurred. Starting from that point, and ac-
cepting the Bank's argument that the record demonstrated that it
would have been futile for the Bank to pursue further local relief, it
would only have been necessary for the Court to characterize the avail-
able variances as administrative remedies that fall within the Patsy
rule, and to hold that inverse condemnation plaintiffs could choose
either a federal or a state remedy. The Court's failure to adopt that
approach indicates that there may be no solid consensus among the
Justices about the general rule that ought to be applied.23 The Court
also may be deterred by the potential for mischief that would lurk in
the adoption of a broad rule requiring compensation for temporary tak-
ings, and thus be waiting for a case that would enable it to fashion a
remedy that will not deluge the federal courts with land use disputes.24
The initial reaction to the Hamilton Bank decision, especially among
the more ardent apostles of compensation as a remedy for regulatory
takings, was dismay that the Court had once more managed to dodge a
resolution of the inverse condemnation controversy. 25 That view is un-
charitable because it has buried in it the assumption that the Justices
do not read certiorari petitions carefully enough. It also ignores the
possibility that occasionally the Court may take a case because four
Justices believe that the lower court has made a mistake that merits
correction as well as to write authoritatively on unsettled constitutional
issues. Therefore, it is too simplistic to regard the Hamilton Bank deci-
sion as yet one more dodge of the inverse condemnation issue. The
Court may have taken the case because the Justices wanted to make it
clear that damages in inverse condemnation for regulatory takings,
whether temporary or permanent, are a remedy of last resort and may
23. One view is that the Court's reluctance to rule on the substantive issue is a result
of both considerations of comity with state judicial systems and a desire to decrease the
workload of the federal courts. See Bauman, Deja Vu, or Et Tu Supreme Court, 37
LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 3 (1985).
24. See, The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 2, at 236-40.
25. For example, Professor Gideon Kanner lamented: "For those readers who have
been holding their breath waiting for some resolution of the taking/compensation issue,
it's time to take another deep breath and to keep on holding it." 29 JusT COMPENSA-
TION, 2 (1985). Notwithstanding the Court's decision to hear the Yolo County case,
given the hurdles that the Hamilton Bank decision has placed in the path of potential
inverse condemnation plaintiffs, Professor Kanner's readers would do well to reflect
carefully on the opinion before they take his advice lest they turn purple while they
wait.
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not be used as a substitute for other forms of remedial relief, especially
when local remedies remain available. Allowing an inverse condemna-
tion damage judgment for a temporary taking to stand on the facts of
this case could easily have emboldened other developers to use the
threat of such action to coerce local planning and zoning bodies to act
in their favor on contested land use disputes.
Indeed, just that appears to have happened in this case. Having had
the educational experience of being on the short end of a $350,000
judgment, the Commission apparently decided to cut its losses. In
March of 1983, while the cross-appeals were pending in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the Commission entered into a stipulation with the Bank under
which an additional 476 dwelling units could be built by the Bank,
variances for cul-de-sacs and road grades were approved, and the par-
ties agreed the 1973 regulations would govern the property.26 The
Court was made aware of that compromise in an Appendix to the
Commission's brief. Although the compromise was not mentioned in
the opinion, it may well have appeared inequitable to the Court that
the Bank should pick up $350,000 on the way to getting permission to
build 476 dwellings, which gave the Bank the entire 688 dwelling units
to which it had claimed to be entitled. The compromise also may have
prompted the suspicion that the Bank might have secured substantial
or full relief from the local agencies if it had just persevered. On that
reading the message of Hamilton Bank is quite simple: Do not take
your land use problems to the federal court until it is quite certain that
you have been hurt.
From a broader perspective, the effect of the Hamilton Bank deci-
sion will be to narrow considerably the number of cases involving land
use regulations that may be amenable to an inverse condemnation ac-
tion for just compensation. Now the plaintiff in such an action will
have to demonstrate that the decision with respect to the applicability
of the regulations is indeed final and that there is no further relief po-
tentially available to the plaintiff which would leave open the question
of what regulations or restrictions are applicable to the property and
what impact those regulations have on the value of the land.
Notwithstanding the Court's distinction between the question of
ripeness for judicial review and the question of whether administrative
26. Appendix to Brief for Petitioners, at 35-39, Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). Since the settlement was
negotiated, the Bank has sold the property to a new developer for $3 million. Merriam,
supra note 5, at 26-27.
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remedies have been exhausted, the practical effect of the Hamilton
Bank decision will be to compel landowners to seek whatever discre-
tionary zoning relief may be available to them before commencing an
inverse condemnation action. One also should expect that municipali-
ties will not be slow to recognize the opportunity that the Hamilton
Bank doctrine affords them to create procedures that will postpone or
even eliminate the day of reckoning at the courthouse. The dangers in
that fertile source of potential inverse condemnation claims, the
amendatory downzoning, 2 can be reduced by requiring vested rights
claims to be presented to the zoning board for an administrative deter-
mination, based on specific standards in the ordinance, with respect to
whether a developer has an investment backed and reasonable expecta-
tion that he will be permitted to complete a development that was ap-
proved under the formerly effective regulations but which has been
caught mid-stream by a change in the applicable ordinances.
Other municipalities may go further and borrow an idea from the
federal surface mining legislation by providing that the zoning ordi-
nance shall not be interpreted to deprive any person of all reasonable
beneficial use of his land. Claims of deprivation could be aired before
the zoning board who would be empowered to grant exceptions, in ac-
cordance with standards in the ordinance, whenever a claimant is able
to establish that the applicable land use regulations prohibit any rea-
sonable economic use of his property. Such procedures could provide
an opportunity for municipalities to relax land use regulations that
might otherwise support a plausible taking claim and would defer a
final decision on the regulations that are applicable to a particular piece
of property until after those procedures have run their course.
Moreover, in states in which an inverse condemnation remedy for
excessive regulation is conferred by statute or recognized by judicial
decision, inverse condemnation claims resting on the federal Constitu-
tion will be premature unless a resort to state created procedures has
demonstrated that compensation is not available. Only in states such
as California, New York, and Florida,2" where the courts have de-
clined to recognize the existence of an inverse condemnation remedy
27. The term "downzoning" is used to describe a rezoning that imposes more re-
strictive controls on density or intensity of use.
28. See Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Fred F. French Investing, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). See also Dade County v. Natl. Bulk Carriers, 450
S.2d 213 (Fla. 1984) (holding that a confiscatory zoning regulation is invalid and the
appropriate remedy is to strike the regulation).
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for overly restrictive regulation, will it be possible for landowners to
turn immediately to an action in the federal courts grounded on the
protection of the fifth amendment. Whether the Supreme Court will
ultimately recognize and allow such a remedy remains undecided.
There is additional disquieting news for land use plaintiffs in the
Hamilton Bank decision because the Court applied the ripeness test to
the defendant's due process argument as well. The Commission had
argued that compensation was not an appropriate remedy because reg-
ulation that is so economically intrusive that it has the same effect as a
taking by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of the police power,
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
remedy for such constitutional transgressions would be invalidation of
the regulation, and when authorized and appropriate, actual dam-
ages.29 The Court, however, found that, even viewed as a due process
claim, the Bank's action was premature because the question of
whether regulation "goes too far" cannot be answered until a court can
be certain how far the regulation goes.30 The implication for Section
1983 actions in land use matters is clear. Recourse to a federal remedy,
whether for injunctive relief or for damages, will apparently not be
available until the aggrieved landowner has endeavored to secure such
discretionary relief as state law and the local ordinances may provide.
So while the Patsy doctrine may retain its vitality in other Section 1983
29. A claim for compensatory damages under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), sub-
jects a municipality to strict liability for damages occasioned by violations, under color
of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). For strict liability to attach, how-
ever, the acts charged must be the product of an official policy, custom, or usage of the
municipality (which includes ordinances). See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
30. Justice Holmes observed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922), that "the general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking." Professor David
Callies believes that the Hamilton Bank opinion can be read as evidence that the major-
ity of the Court is leaning toward acceptance of the argument that the remedy for regu-
latory takings, whether permanent or temporary, should be invalidation of the
regulation rather than compensation. See Callies, The Taking Issue Revisited, 37 LAND
USE LAW & ZONING DIGESr 6. The Court's recent decision in United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 U.S. 455 (1985), makes that reading of the Court's dis-
position more doubtful. Riverside involved the question of whether a Corp of Engineers
permit requirement under the Clean Water Act, Title 33 U.S.C. § 1251, produced a
taking of Riverside Bayview's property. In rejecting the claim that the permit require-
ment amounted to a taking, the Court said that "so long as compensation is available
for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitu-
tional." 106 U.S. at 459-60.
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litigation, in land use disputes it does not appear that it will excuse
aggrieved landowners from pursuing relief, and a final decision, by way
of variance or exception. Resort to such procedures is what usually is
meant by the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.
V. OF REGULATORY TAKINGS: MATTERS OF TAXONOMY
Adoption of a rule that regulatory takings constitutionally require
compensation would answer one question at the risk of setting loose a
new collection of furies to bedevil municipalities, land owners, develop-
ers, and their counsel.
First, the question of what constitutes a regulatory taking is a com-
plex one because the governmental activities that may produce a taking
claim occupy a broad spectrum of regulation. Once governmental con-
duct moves beyond the physical invasion or appropriation of land, the
problem of identifying takings becomes progressively more difficult.
The difficulty of identifying when a taking has occurred was acknowl-
edged in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City where the
Court defined a taking as a regulation that makes the use of property
no longer "economically viable," but conceded that, "the question of
what constitutes a 'taking' for the purpose of the Fifth Amendment has
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty."'"
It is doubtful that even the most ardent of police power hawks would
argue that regulation can never result in a taking. Indeed, the govern-
ment, as amicus, conceded that point in the Hamilton Bank oral argu-
32ment. There are some kinds of regulatory activity that are
tantamount to a physical invasion of land and that warrant treatment
as such.33 For example, regulations that had the effect of giving the
31. 438 U.S. 104, 123, 131, 136-38 (1978).
32. Transcript of oral argument at 28-29, Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
Question: Well, does the government concede that there could be a taking in the
eminent domain sense where there has been no physical occupancy of
land?
Mr. Kneedler: Yes, yes, we are not arguing that regulation can never constitute a tak-
ing. Our only point is that compensation isn't due unless the legisla-
ture has authorized the agency to do this.
Id.
33. In a prior publication the author noted the wide spectrum of regulatory activi-
ties that produce taking claims and grouped such claims into the following six catego-
ries: (1) The physical invasion cases, such as flowage and avigation easements, and
other regulations having the efrect of producing a physical invasion; (2) instances in
which government plans acquisition, states so, and engages in other inequitable conduct
designed to depress the acquisition price; (3) cases in which regulation prevents any
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general public access to plaintiff's previously private marina 4 and
which authorized a cable television company to place wires on a build-
ing without the consent of the owner35 were both held to be takings
which could not be sustained in the absence of compensation. 6
There is a second class of cases in which it is clear that a governmen-
tal body intends to acquire land, has said so, and has delayed or stalled
actual acquisition for the purpose, or with the effect, of depressing the
price of the land to be acquired. In such cases the landowner's action
for inverse condemnation is simply a method of forcing the exercise of
the power of eminent domain and, more importantly, of securing a val-
uation date that precedes the time when inequitable or oppressive gov-
ernmental conduct began to force down the value of the land. 7
reasonable economic use including those cases in which government planned acquisition
but abandoned acquisition and substituted severely restrictive regulations; (4) the
designation of land for future acquisition unaccompanied by governmental inequitable
conduct; (5) cases in which it is claimed that regulation has substantially diminished the
value of land; (6) moratorium cases, which involve a prohibition of all use but for a
limited period of time. See Smith, The Aftermath of the Brennan Dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric, 8 PLAN. & L. DIv. NEWSLETrER 1 (1984).
34. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
35. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
36. See also Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal. 3d 285, 142 Cal. Rptr. 429, 572
P.2d 43 (1978) (treatment plant odors that made plaintiff's land virtually uninhabit-
able); Jupiter Inlet Corp. v. Village of Tequesta, 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), rev'd, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979) (appropriation of water from beneath plaintiff's
land through wells on adjoining land).
37. See Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F.2d 1141, 1147 (7th
Cir.), cert. den., 104 S. Ct. 151 (1983) ("a 'taking' can be found without any physical
invasion where a public agency acting in furtherance of a public project, directly and
substantially interferes with property rights and significantly impairs the value of prop-
erty," which "typically occurs when the public entity excessively delays condemnation
proceedings after the property is slated for acquisition or otherwise acts unreasonably");
Urbanizodora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (use of official
map designation to reserve land for future road and freeze property in undeveloped
condition for fourteen years deprived owner of its property without due process of law);
Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (five year "cloud of condemna-
tion" held unreasonable and resulted in a taking at the point in time that the property
fell under the cloud); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl.
1970) (action by federal government held to be a "taking of the entire fee" when it
included land in tracts to be acquired for Point Reyes National Seashore, effectively
prevented subdivision approval, destroyed the marketability of the land, and then de-
clined to condemn or say when it would commence condemnation); Maryland Nat.
Capital Park v. Chadwick, 286 Md.1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979) (three year reservation of
plaintiff's land for possible acquisition for a public park was an abuse of police power);
Jensen v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 1079, (1977), 369 N.E.2d 1179 (1979) (official
usage designation that made it impossible for plaintiff to secure a building permit, fi-
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A third and more troublesome category are cases in which regula-
tion deprives land of all reasonably viable economic uses."8 It includes
instances in which government restricts the use of land to open space
or public use and cases in which it is apparent that severely restrictive
regulation has been substituted for acquisition which was attempted
but abandoned or which it is plain the agency has concluded it cannot
afford.39 This class of cases has produced three of the five state court
decisions that have rested on the rationale of Justice Brennan's dissent
in San Diego Gas. In Burrows v. Keene ' the city planning board at-
tempted to dissuade the plaintiff from seeking approval of a subdivision
plat because the city was trying to preserve the land as open space.
Negotiations for purchase ensued, but the parties could not reach
agreement on the price. The plaintiff sought subdivision approval and
in response the city classified all but 15 acres of the tract in a conserva-
nancing for repairs, or sell her property, was a deprivation of property without due
process); Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (1977) (regulation that
required connection to a public sewer when sewer capacity was not available because of
municipal inaction was not facially a taking, but case was remanded for a determination
as to the reasonableness of the delay); San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Bros.,
528 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App., 1975) (damages awarded for permit delay to hold down
acquisition price of a dam site).
38. What constitutes a reasonably viable economic use of land depends heavily on
the land's character. As a result, the more recent decisions generally have sustained
severely restrictive regulation of environmentally sensitive lands, such as wetlands and
floodplains. See Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Env. Protection, 362 A.2d 948
(Conn. 1975); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d
891, cert. den., 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Maple Leaf Investors v. State of Washington, 88
Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972). See also Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.),
cert. den., Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (court used harm/benefit analysis,
refusing to find a taking despite the fact that the wetlands regulation reduced by one-
half the development's size); Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (even though acquatic zoning left little use for land, no taking when
land's submerged condition meant little use of land anyway). But see Annicelli v. Town
of Kingston, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983). In Annicelli, plaintiff's barrier beach property
was designated a "High Flood Danger" district, prohibiting construction of single fam-
ily homes. The court held that the restriction was a taking because it deprived plaintiff
of all beneficial use and was designed to benefit the public. The court ruled that com-
pensation was the remedy for the taking, rather than invalidation of the restriction and
an order directing issuance of a building permit.
39. See Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal,
1975), vacated by stipulation, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal., 1976), in which after exten-
sive negotiations for acquisition, the Director of Planning proposed the use of regulation
instead of acquisition to preserve open space.
40. 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
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tion zone in which development was forbidden. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that the state constitution required the payment of
compensation because "[t]he city sought to enjoy [a] public benefit by
forcing the plaintiffs to devote their land to a particular purpose and
prohibiting all other economically feasible uses of the land, thus plac-
ing the entire burden of preserving the land as open space upon the
plaintiffs.,
4 1
In Sheerr v. Evesham Township42 the classification of land for public
park and recreation purposes' produced a ruling that the regulations
were a taking notwithstanding the protestations of the town officials
that acquisition of the plaintiff's land was not intended. Instead of or-
dering the town to acquire the property, the court held the regulations
invalid and set the matter for a hearing to determine the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff as a result of the temporary taking. In Ripley v.
City of Lincoln, a similar but more outrageously candid instance, a
North Dakota municipality zoned land for "public use" because it in-
tended to use the site for a school, city hall, and possibly a fire sta-
tion.43 The ordinance that restricted the land said that its purpose was
"to prohibit residential, commercial and industrial use of the land" and
"to prohibit any use of the land which would diminish its value in serv-
ing the needs of the City." The court held that the restriction was a
taking and remanded so that the city could decide whether to repeal or
persevere in the restriction and, once it made its choice, for the trial
court to determine the appropriate measure of damages.
In each of these three categories of cases, outrage over the conduct
of government can easily obscure the real differences. In both of the
first two instances, if compensation is awarded in an inverse condemna-
tion action, it will result in the agency acquiring title to, or an interest
(such as an easement) in, the land involved. However, in the third
class of cases the governmental body does not acquire any right, title,
or interest for the "compensation" it pays unless it elects to proceed
with acquisition. If instead the government elects to repeal the offend-
ing regulation, then compensation for the temporary taking is no more
than the assessment of damages against the agency for having adopted
an invalid regulation.
The potential sweep of a compensation rule in cases in which the
municipality repents and repeals an overly restrictive regulation are
41. Id. at 600, 432 A.2d at 21.
42. 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982).
43. 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 n.2 (N.D. 1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/2
INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS
staggering. Once applied to land use regulation, it would be logical to
extend the same principle to other types of police power regulation.
Not surprisingly, such an extension has already occurred. In Zinn v.
State" the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the idea of awarding
compensation for temporary takings to a technical title divestiture that
resulted when a state agency made, and then later corrected, an errone-
ous determination with respect to the high water mark of a lake.
The broader implications of compensating temporary takings ap-
pears to have troubled Justice Stevens for during the course of the
Hamilton Bank argument he asked counsel for the Bank:
In thinking back to some of the old rate cases where a commission
sets the utility rates at a low level, then they appeal to the state
supreme court, and the state supreme court says no, that is a tak-
ing without due process of law, the rates are too low, they can't
use their property, and they reverse and require that the new rates
be put into effect, would the utilities always be able to get damages
from the lower commission in those cases?4 5
It was a very pertinent point because it highlights the risk that a rule
that is developed in the setting of land use disputes may spill over into
unrelated areas of regulation with quite unanticipated and mischievous
consequences.46
Perhaps it was concern for the potential reach of a compensation
rule in the case of temporary takings that led Justice Stevens to pro-
vide, in his concurrence, what amounts to a rebuttal of the position
taken by Justice Brennan in his San Diego Gas dissent. Justice Stevens
would apply different analytical approaches to permanent and tempo-
rary takings. The former are those restrictions that "permanently cur-
tail the economic value of the property." In contrast, temporary
takings involve the employment of procedures to obtain permission to
use property in a particular way for a limited time or to remove an
unlawful restriction. Those procedures, he conceded, "may temporar-
ily deprive an owner of a fair return on his investment."'"
Justice Stevens classified permanent harms into three categories:
(1) those that are not permitted even if government is willing to pro-
44. 112 Wisc. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
45. Transcript of oral argument at 55, Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
46. See, e.g., Pratt v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 309 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1981). In Pratt, the court concluded it was possible that a regulation prohibiting the use
of mechanical pickers in harvesting wild rice might result in a taking.
47. 105 S. Ct. at 3125.
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vide compensation; (2) those that are permissible if compensation is
paid; and (3) those that are permissible even if no compensation is paid.
When a court concludes that a government regulation does not fall
within the third category, Justice Stevens says that a court can either
find the regulation invalid or characterize it as a taking. In such
situations:
[T]here is nothing in the Constitution that prevents the Govern-
ment from electing to abandon the permanent harmcausing regu-
lation. The fact that a jurist as eminent as Oliver Wendell Holmes
characterized a regulation that 'goes too far' as a 'taking' does not
mean that such a regulation may never be cancelled and must al-
ways give rise to a right to compensation. 48
Justice Stevens agreed that as a "permanent harm" case the dispute
before the Court was not ripe for review because it was not possible to
determine the severity of the injury. Even though the regulations al-
ready had inflicted a "fairly serious harm-one that the jury calculated
as worth $350,000," he would classify that harm as temporary. 49
According to Justice Stevens there are two types of temporary harm:
"those that result from a deliberate decision to appropriate property to
public use for a limited period of time; and those that are a by-product
of governmental decisionmaking." The second category, he said, "is
fairly characterized as an inevitable cost of doing business in a highly
regulated society" and are an "unfortunate but necessary byproduct of
disputes over the extent of the Government's power to inflict perma-
nent harms without paying for them.""0 Although statutes authorizing
the recovery of litigation costs and attorneys' fees provide a measure of
compensation for some temporary harms, in most cases, as Justice Ste-
vens concedes, there is no effective damage remedy for the property
owner unless his constitutional rights have been violated. If the rights
of a property owner are harmed:
... even temporarily-without due process of law, he may have a
claim for damages based on the denial of his procedural rights.
But if the procedure that has been employed to determine whether
a particular regulation 'goes too far' is fair, I know of nothing in
the Constitution that entitles him to recover for this type of tem-
porary harm.51
48. Id. at 3125-26.
49. Id. at 3126.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3126-27 (emphasis added).
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For Justice Stevens the requirement of fair procedures that flows from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not a command
that regulation may never impose any cost upon the citizen "unless the
Government's position is completely vindicated.",
5 2
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion provides an articulate and per-
suasive rejection of the superficial simplicity of the idea of awarding
compensation for temporary takings. The potential ramifications of
that idea in areas of police power regulation that are far removed from
land use are awesome. The Stevens concurrence has put the issue back
in its proper perspective and if adopted by the Court would remove the
spectre of governmental monetary liability as an inevitable risk of good
faith, procedurally fair attempts to regulate that a court later decides
are not constitutionally sustainable. It is also required reading for mu-
nicipal officials, in whom it should prompt the idea that local ordi-
nances should contain a procedurally fair safety valve for taking
claims.
The first of the three categories of permanent harms listed by Justice
Stevens suggests a further problem. As he noted, some permanent
harms are not permissible even when government is willing to pay for
them. A corollary of that observation is that there are some instances
in which government does not have authority to acquire property even
if it is willing to pay compensation. If government is not authorized to
pay compensation for the right to take private property, then by what
authority may the courts compel government to do what it would not
be allowed to do voluntarily? The Ninth Circuit has considered that
point and concluded that an agency or political subdivision that does
not have the power of eminent domain cannot be sued for damages for
inverse condemnation.5 3
52. Id. at 3127. Justice Stevens rejected the notion that temporary regulatory tak-
ings always require compensation. Justice Stevens contended:
We must presume that regulatory bodies such as zoning boards, school boards, and
health boards, generally make a good-faith effort to advance the public interest
when they are performing their official duties, but we must also recognize that they
will often become involved in controversies that they will ultimately lose. Even
though those controversies are costly and temporarily harmful to the private citi-
zens, as long as fair procedures are followed, I do not believe there is any basis in
the Constitution for characterizing the inevitable byproduct of every such dispute
as a 'taking' of private property.
Id.
53. Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1978),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391 (1979). The Supreme Court did not rule directly on the effect of the
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In the ordinary case, the question of whether the government that
adopted the land use regulation has authority to take property for pub-
lic use does not present a problem. Most such regulations are the prod-
uct of local legislative bodies that do have eminent domain authority.
The Hamilton Bank case, however, was an exceptional situation be-
cause the conduct that was alleged to be a taking there was the action
of the Regional Planning Commission, a body which does not have the
power of eminent domain.54 The Commission does, however, have au-
thority to adopt subdivision regulations and approve subdivision
plats.55 Thus, in this particular instance, requiring compensation for
regulatory takings would produce an anomalous result. A court would
have ordered the Commission to pay for what the laws of Tennessee
would not have permitted the Commission to acquire, even if it was
willing to pay for the acquisition.56
The clamor for a compensation remedy for regulatory takings might
more readily be accommodated if it were confined to three classes of
cases: (1) those in which regulation results in a physical invasion;
(2) those in which the agency intends to acquire and has pursued a
course of conduct designed to, or with the effect of, depressing the ac-
quisition price; and (3) those in which government has employed se-
verely restrictive regulation either to avoid the expense of acquisition
while still securing a public benefit or to freeze property in an undevel-
oped state so as to preserve its availability for later governmental
acquisition.
absence of eminent domain authority in the agency. On remand, the district judge car-
ried the logic one step further and stated that it was "beyond the ken of this Court" to
explain why damages that were not recoverable in an inverse condemnation action
could be secured in a § 1983 due process action for damages. Jacobsen v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901, 904, (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd., 661 F.2d 940
(1981) (without opinion).
54. The Commission's powers are set out in TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-103 and 104
(1973). There is no mention of the power of eminent domain.
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-402 (power to approve plats) and § 13-403 (authority
to adopt subdivision regulations).
56. In Fountain v Metropolitan Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (1 1th Cir.
1982), the court disagreed with the Jacobsen decision's reasoning that it would "under-
mine the force of the just compensation clause" if redress were not available, and the
state could escape liability under the just compensation clause by taking property
through agencies that did not have eminent domain authority. The court asserted: "we
think that the threat of this kind of shell game ought to be avoided." 678 F.2d at 1044.
Fountain, however, was not a regulatory taking case. Plaintiff's inverse condemnation
claim was for compensation for temporary obstruction of access during subway con-
struction and permanent deprivation of access from street closings.
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As one might suspect, however, more is afoot here than an effort to
provide a remedy for egregious or odious conduct by local government.
Instances of such municipal malpractice, while not uncommon, are
rare when compared to the commonplace fact that land use regulations
often adversely affect the value that land would otherwise have. Such
an adverse affect often occurs when revision of local land use ordi-
nances produces a downzoning that forecloses land uses that were pre-
viously available. Efforts to employ inverse condemnation as a means
of securing compensation for a diminution in the value of land occa-
sioned by regulation have been notably unsuccessful.57 If judicial ac-
ceptance of compensation for temporary takings could be gained,
however, quite different results might be secured in the value diminu-
tion cases. Then a temporary taking that terminated with a determina-
tion of invalidity would diminish the return on property, and hence its
value, by postponing the realization of income and increasing carrying
costs. Moreover, for its advocates, the real charm of compensation for
temporary takings is that the landowner gets to retain title to the prop-
erty and to preserve the possibility of a real windfall if the market sub-
sequently proves him to have been wrong about the amount of damage
that was inflicted by the temporary imposition of an invalid regulation.
There are further hazards. The application of the temporary taking
nostrum could disrupt comprehensive municipal planning for future
land acquisition. Absent some inequitable or oppressive conduct by
government, any chilling effect on property value that might result
from the designation of land for possible future public acquisition has
not usually been thought to require compensation.58 But Justice Bren-
nan would compensate for the temporary taking of "most" of the
land's value.59 By that measure any diminution of more than one-half
of the value of a parcel by reason of its designation for future acquisi-
tion would be compensable and would either impose on government
the burden of an interim compensation payment or of accelerating the
57. See Wm. C. Haas Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 508, 542 P.2d
237. 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Gold Run Ltd. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44, 554 P.2d 317 (1976); Mailman Dev.
Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
58. See, e.g., Allen Family Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 525 F. Supp. 38 (W.D.
Mo., 1981); Selby Realty v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111,
109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581
P.2d 50 (1978).
59. 450 U.S. at 653.
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acquisition of land the need for which had yet to be fully established
and which might not ultimately be acquired. Either consequence could
severely complicate municipal land use planning.
Moreover, were the contention that temporary takings should be
compensated to receive the blessing of the Supreme Court, the ability
of municipalities to impose development moratoriums might be emper-
iled. Such drastic municipal action, often prompted by an environmen-
tal or planning crisis, has heretofore enjoyed widespread judicial
acceptance.6° The central feature of the typical moratorium ordinance
is that it deprives landowners of all use of their land for a temporary
period of time-a deprivation that might be constitutionally impermis-
sible if it were permanent. The public welfare justification for such
draconian measures is frequently clear. However, if the owners of real
estate may constitutionally be required to bear that burden without
compensation, why is it unjust to require property owners to bear the
financial burdens that attend upon the process of deciding the validity
of regulations that have been challenged?
The notion that government should have to compensate individuals
affected by land use regulation for any monetary burdens imposed
while the validity of the regulation is being determined was rejected by
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion. A similar view was ex-
pressed in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton,61 in which an inverse
condemnation complaint alleged that a comprehensive plan designated
plaintiff's land for future acquisition and that city officials had told the
plaintiff its land was certain to be acquired and that it would be useless
to pursue private development plans. Justice Hans Linde, writing for
the Oregon Supreme Court, pointed out that many kinds of police
power regulations produce economic burdens or financial loss, but
that:
Business invests with the knowledge of such governmental power
to make laws for its conduct, and the balancing of regulatory goals
against their economic consequences is the daily stuff of politics
rather than of litigation for 'just compensation.'... Regulation in
60. Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County, 567 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Collura v.
Town of Arlington, 367 Mass. 881, 329 N.E.2d 733 (1975); Capture Realty Org. v.
Board of Adjustment, 126 N.J. Super. 200, 313 A.2d 624 (1973), aff'd, 133 N.J. Super.
216, 336 A.2d 30 (1975), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); City of Dallas v. Crownrich,
506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1974).
61. 294 Or. 254, 656 P.2d 306 (1982).
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pursuit of a public policy is not equivalent to taking for a public
use, even if the regulated property is land.62
The knowledge that government may make laws for the conduct of
business necessarily includes the knowledge that on occasion those
laws will prompt a challenge to their validity and that a byproduct of
such disputes may be that economic burdens will be imposed while the
validity of a regulation is being determined. That happens, as Justice
Linde observed, "to many forms of business enterprise and private in-
vestment, not peculiarly to investment in real property. 63 Conse-
quently, there is no persuasive reason for exempting investments in real
property from the same financial risks and burdens that other forms of
investment routinely carry.
VI. OF REGULATORY TAKINGS: MATTERS OF MEASUREMENT
If the Supreme Court was to accept the idea that compensation must
be paid for temporary takings, difficult problems will still remain for it,
or what is more likely, for the state and lower federal courts to resolve.
Two key issues are entirely unsettled. One is the period of time over
which the temporary taking extends. The other is the calculation of
the compensation that should be paid for the taking.
The former problem had an easy solution in the Hamilton Bank case
because the inception of the taking could be pinpointed at the denial of
subdivision plat approval. Without saying so, the Sixth Circuit treated
the end of the taking period as the trial court judgment finding that the
Commission was estopped from applying any regulations other than
those that were in effect in 1973.
It will not always be so easy, however. In his San Diego Gas dissent,
Justice Brennan seemed to accept without critical analysis the idea that
the taking would occur on the date that the offending regulation was
adopted. There are serious deficiencies, however, with that approach.
In the real world, land use regulations that later turn out to be a taking
frequently are adopted long before it occurs to a landowner to seek
judicial relief from the regulation. A more puzzling problem is
presented by the fact that a regulation that is quite reasonable when
adopted may, with the passage of time, become unreasonable because
of what has happened to land use patterns in the meantime. In those
cases, in order to determine when the taking occurred, the courts will
62. Id. at 259, 656 P.2d at 309.
63. Id.
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have to engage in something close to divination in order to fix a com-
mencement date from which to calculate the value of the temporary
taking.
The date that the unconstitutional regulation was adopted frequently
will not be an appropriate date from which to calculate a temporary
taking. In many instances other points in time will be more logical,
including the date when the landowner initially requested relief from
the governmental body, when relief was refused, and when the regula-
tion was judicially determined to be a taking. Choosing the date of
adoption of the unconstitutional regulation as the beginning of the tak-
ing period offers an opportunity for abuse because it permits the land-
owner to suffer in silence and allow his damages to multiply without
ever putting the municipality on notice that there is a claim that an
unconstitutional regulation has been imposed. As a result, silence in
the face of onerous restrictions will be compensated more generously
than immediate outrage.
The Hamilton Bank decision at least does provide some guidance on
the point, although the Court may not have intended it. In holding
that an inverse condemnation claim does not ripen until there has been
a final decision with respect to the regulations that will be applied to
the plaintiff's property, the Court has implied that no taking occurs
until all avenues for discretionary relief from the restrictions have been
explored and found to be closed. Under this rationale, the period of a
temporary taking would commence only at the point in time at which
the municipal mind with respect to the applicable regulations has be-
come final.
The measure of compensation presents equally difficult problems.
There is first of all the question of whether we are talking about com-
pensation for acquiring an interest in realty or simply compensatory
damages for constitutionally wrongful conduct. If it is the former,
then the fair market value of the interest taken, the value of an option
to purchase, or rental value may be the appropriate measure of com-
pensation. In the latter case, additional out of pocket costs, and per-
haps lost opportunity costs, might be more appropriate factors. A
diminution in market value or in rate of return might in some cases be
an appropriate measure of compensatory damages. Some of these ap-
proaches to valuing a temporary taking may be a bit speculative, but it
remained for Justice Brennan to provide the most speculative approach
of all. In his San Diego Gas dissent he said:
If the regulation denies the private property owner the use and
enjoyment of his land and is found to affect a 'taking' it is only fair
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that the public bear the cost of benefits received during the interim
period between application of the regulation and the government
entity's rescission of it.'
Measuring the value of what has been taken temporarily by the govern-
ment will be difficult enough. Putting a dollar figure on the "cost of
benefits received" by the public during the period of the taking ought
to tax the ingenuity of even the most innovative members of the bar
and the judiciary.
Despite the number of cases that have adopted the "temporary tak-
ing" approach of Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, there has been
precious little guidance in the reported decisions on the issue of how
temporary takings are to be measured and valued.65 In Nemmers v.
City of Dubuque66 a downzoning was involved. The court previously
held that the property owner's expenditures in reliance upon the expec-
tation that the property could be developed for industrial purposes had
given him a vested right in the prior zoning. The case then was re-
manded for determination of damages. After the district court had de-
clined to award damages on the ground that insufficiency of the
evidence made any damage award uncertain and speculative, the case
returned to the court of appeal. The Eighth Circuit held that the pe-
riod of the temporary taking extended from the date on which the
property was reclassified from industrial to residential use to the date
the district court entered its judgment. Both parties to the litigation
measured damages on the basis of the interest that would have accrued
during that three and one-half year period and both used an interest
rate of 15 percent. The property owner sought to apply that interest
rate to the estimated $510,000 fair market value of the property, while
the city contended that it should only be applied to the estimated dif-
ference in value occasioned by the downzoning. The court of appeals
held that at a minimum the district court should have accepted the
city's estimate of a diminished value of $141,450 and computed the
value of the temporary taking at 15 percent per annum of that amount.
Therefore the court directed the entry of an order awarding damages of
$89,812.35.
64. 450 U.s. at 656.
65. In Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968),
the court ruled that a subdivision regulation requiring the reservation for one year of
land for possible public acquisition required the payment of the value of an option to
purchase.
66. 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985).
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The Burrows, Suess Builders, and Zinn cases were all remanded to
the trial court, Burrows and Zinn for the assessment of damages and
Suess Builders for a trial on the merits in which a damage award would
have been a possibility. In the Sheerr opinion the trial court dealt with
the liability phase of the case and reserved the question of damages for
a further hearing.
Only the Zinn case produced a jury verdict with respect to damages.
There the jury found that the period of the temporary taking extended
from the agency's erroneous determination to the date on which that
decision was vacated. The jury awarded compensation for the rental
value of the property taken for that period in the amount of
$20,774.66. In addition, the jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to
compensation for engineering fees, survey fees, witness fees, photo-
graphs, and attorneys' fees, and they assessed compensatory damages
on those items in the amount of $11,649.56. That judgment is now on
appeal.67 So in that instance the temporary taking concept produced
not only compensation for the value of the interest and property that
was taken from the plaintiff but also compensation for the expenses
incurred by the plaintiff in securing the award of compensation.
The Burrows case was settled when the city bought 124 acres of the
property for $110,000 in settlement of all claims, receiving a deed for
that part of the property.68 In the Suess Builders case, the question of
the computation of damages or compensation was never reached be-
cause after a two week trial the jury returned a verdict for the defend-
ant. The case has been appealed again to the Oregon Court of
Appeals.69
67. Letter from Thomas O'Meara, Jr., attorney for plaintiff, to the author (October
11, 1985).
68. Letter from Charles H. Morang, former City Attorney for Keene, to the author
(October 7, 1985).
69. Letter from Carroll F. Bradley, attorney for the defendant city to the author
(October 1, 1985). The case was argued in September 1985. No opinion had been re-
ported when this article went to press. Mr. Bradley included the jury instructions in his
correspondence. The portion dealing with the measure of damages reads as follows:
The interest in property allegedly taken in this case is described as:
The right of the taker to purchase the property at any time, between the time the
taking occurred and when it ended, with the requirement that if the taker does
decide to purchase the property he must pay its fair cash market value at the time
of the purchase.
The term "option" to purchase has been used during trial as a shorthand way to
refer to the property interest in question.
If you find that the defendants or either of them, took such an interest in plain-
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In the Sheerr case the trial court determined that the taking would
extend from the initial adoption of the defective zoning to the date that
new lawful zoning was in place, either by agreement of the parties to
that effect or by judicial determination. The parties were advised that
if a lawful zoning was not enacted in a reasonable period of time, the
court would order the township to commence eminent domain pro-
ceedings. The court ruled that the matter of compensation for the tem-
porary taking was to be based upon the amount of money that would
be required to purchase an option to acquire the property for the pe-
riod of the temporary taking. The value of that option was to be
proven by the testimony of an appraiser holding qualifications as a
member of the American Institute of Appraisal. The trial court also
ruled that the plaintiffs were to be reimbursed for all real estate taxes,
witness fees, and counsel fees under the Civil Rights Act.7° Counsel
for the plaintiff estimated that the claim would have totaled some
$350,000. The 55 acres of woodland involved in the Sheerr case was
but a portion of a larger 160 acre tract. The plaintiff decided that par-
tial compensation and favorable zoning for the entire 160 acres would
be a more desirable result. Therefore, a consent decree was entered
providing for the payment of $25,000 in compensation and a zoning
classification for the property that plaintiff thought was sufficiently
favorable to permit the sale of the land at an attractive price.7"
The confusing consequences of Justice Brennan's idea should begin
to be apparent. Those few courts that have had to consider the ques-
tion of the measure of damages have entangled what are logically two
separate concepts. Inverse condemnation is a remedy that is designed
to allow property owners to compel the valuation of property that has
been taken for public use by a governmental body and the payment of
compensation for the property or interest in property that has been
taken. Section 1983 actions are designed to secure compensatory dam-
ages from governmental bodies for transgressions of the Constitution
and laws of the United States. In temporary taking cases these quite
separate grounds of recovery have become entwined and, as in the Zinn
tiffs' property, it is your duty to determine the fair cash market value of the interest
taken.
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (1982).
71. Letter from Michael D. Varbalow, attorney for the plaintiff, to the author (Oc-
tober 17, 1985). Mr. Varbalow's letter provided important insights into the facts of the
case that do not appear in the opinion. For example, the letter reveals that the trial
court heard a tape recording of a township board meeting that was very damaging to
the defendant's claim that acquisition was not intended.
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case, the property owner has been permitted to recover on both
grounds. That result raises the question of whether a hidden vice in
the temporary taking idea is that it tends to produce a double recovery.
So there is real merit in accepting Justice Stevens' view that, as long as
the procedures employed by the governmental body are procedurally
fair, the cost of awaiting a judicial determination with respect to the
question of whether regulation is a taking should be regarded as simply
one of the burdens that is borne by all forms of economic activity in a
complex society.
VII. OF REGULATORY TAKINGS: MATTERS OF REMEDY
In the early cases in which compensation was sought for regulation
that was tantamount to a taking, the compensation remedy had a more
traditional look because the payment of compensation bought some-
thing for the governmental body--either title to the property or an
easement interest.72 In such cases the discovery that an award of com-
pensation would be accompanied by the opportunity to deliver a deed
undoubtedly dampened the ardor of many property owners for inverse
condemnation as a remedy. The popularity of Justice Brennan's tem-
porary taking idea is attributable to the fact that no interest in the re-
alty has to be surrendered by the landowner. He simply recovers for
whatever diminution in the value of his land may have resulted from
having been required to forego development while the validity of the
regulation was being contested. Therefore, a critical flaw in the argu-
ment that temporary takings must constitutionally be compensated is
that it would upset the fundamental rule of land use law that a diminu-
tion in the value of property caused by a land use regulation is not a
constitutionally forbidden taking without compensation.73 A remedy
with such precedent shattering consequences that also carries with it
the risk of grievous fiscal consequences for municipalities that fail to
guess right on a matter of law that gives the Supreme Court "consider-
able difficulty"'74 ought not to be adopted as long as less disruptive rem-
72. See, e.g., Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated by stipulation, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
73. Courts have sustained regulations having far more economic impact than a tem-
porary interruption in use. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(75% reduction in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% reduc-
tion in value); Wm. C. Haas Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979)
(95% reduction in value).
74. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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edies remain available; and there are such remedies.
The advocates of compensation argue that invalidation of the offend-
ing regulation is an ineffective remedy because the municipality can
replace the invalid regulation with one that gives the property owner
little real relief.7 5 However, that can occur only if the courts are un-
willing to use their equitable powers to fashion genuinely effective rem-
edies. The need for judicial relief that goes beyond invalidation of the
unconstitutional regulation was perceived by the Illinois Supreme
Court a generation ago. Justice Schaefer of that court then said:
[I]t is appropriate for the court ... [to frame] its decree with
reference to the record before it, and particularly with reference to
the evidence offered at the trial. In most of the cases that have
come before us in recent years, a specific use was contemplated
and the record was shaped in terms of that use. In such cases the
relief awarded may guarantee that the owner will be allowed to
proceed with that use without further litigation and that he will
not proceed with a different use. If the land owner asserts a
broader challenge in terms of a class of uses, the decree may be
shaped accordingly.76
Decrees forbidding interference with.a specific proposed use or with a
class of uses have been commonplace in the Illinois courts ever since.
75. Justice Brennan noted the opportunity for municipalities to avoid the day of
reckoning by amending their regulations, thereby requiring the landowner to return to
"go" and start over in his San Diego Gas dissent. In a footnote, he referred to the
arrogant advice given seven years earlier by a speaker at a National Institute of Munici-
pal Law Officers conference in San Diego. The speaker told his fellow attorneys: "If all
else fails, merely amend the regulation and start over." See San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at
655 n.22. The author heard the original speech and winced as he did so. The full
passage can be found in Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on
Land Use Regulations (including Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO MUNICIPAL
LAW REVIEW 192-93 (1975). Just prior to that conference a California intermediate
appellate court had held that compensation in inverse condemnation for regulatory tak-
ings was available, producing an air of panic among the distinguished municipal attor-
neys. The California Supreme Court later restored calm by reversing the heresy of the
lower court in HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
76. Sinclair Pipeline v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 379, 167 N.E.2d 406,
411 (1960). See also Franklin v. Franklin Park, 19 Il. 2d 381, 267 N.E.2d 195 (1960).
Sinclair dealt with proof that supported the reasonableness of a specific use, and Frank-
lin applied the Sinclair rationale to a class of uses. Judge David W. Craig of the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania has pointed out to the author that similar relief is
available in Pennsylvania. In Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d
464 (1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that effective relief required that a
court go beyond invalidation and grant definitive relief by ordering the issuance of
building permits.
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In New Jersey, similar relief, called a "builder's remedy," has been au-
thorized as a means of implementing the requirement that every mu-
nicipality utilize its land use ordinances to ensure the provision of their
fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing.77
In Pennsylvania, a statutory mechanism has been adopted that permits
landowners to secure judicial relief that guarantees them a reasonable
beneficial use of their land.78 In one form or another invalidation plus
a builder's remedy affords effective relief because it ensures that the
owner or developer will be able to use the land in a reasonable fashion.
A significant share of the blame for the ineffectiveness of simple in-
validation as a remedy is attributable to the still persistent belief that
the decisions of local government with respect to the uses to be permit-
ted on a particular parcel of land are legislative decisions the validity of
which is to be tested by the same standards as generally are applied to
police power regulations. A few courts have recognized that character-
izing site specific land use decisions as legislative insulates them from
meaningful judicial review. These courts have rejected the characteri-
zation of such decisions as legislative and have characterized them as
quasi-judicial.79 The consequence of a quasi-judicial characterization
77. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount Laurel
I); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. title 53, § 11011(2), (Purdon's Supp., 1980) ("the Curative
Amendment" statute) provides:
If the court... finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order thereunder
which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or restricts a develop-
ment or use which has been described by the landowner through plans and other
materials submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality
whose action or, failure to act is in question on the appeal, it may order the de-
scribed development or use approved as to all elements or it may order it approved
as to some elements and refer other elements to the governing body, agency or
officer having jurisdiction thereof for further proceedings, including the adoption of
alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's opinion and order.
79. See Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); Cooper v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980); Golden v. Overland Park, 224
Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978); Lowe v. City of Missoula, 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551
(1974); Fasano v. Bd. of Comm'rs., 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of
Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). One of the more recent decisions to
jettison the legislative characterization explained that:
We are persuaded the cases which characterize as quasi-judicial the action of a
zoning body in applying general rules or policies to specific individuals, interests,
or situations represent the better rule. The shield from meaningful judicial review
which the legislative label provides is inappropriate in these highly particularized
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is that on judicial review the question of whether the local decision was
arbitrary or capricious is based upon an inquiry into the extent to
which there was substantial evidence to support the decision. When a
plaintiff prevails in that form of judicial review, the result is not invali-
dation of the regulation, but a decree finding that plaintiff was entitled
to the relief he had sought from the local agency and an order to the
agency to grant it. Such specific relief will prevent the pyrrhic victories
that may result from a simple invalidation decree.
So the argument that mandatory compensation is the only way to
secure effective relief for landowners is not supportable. What it really
would do is load the scales in favor of the landowner and developer and
make it possible for unscrupulous members of that fraternity to employ
bellicose threats of damage liability as a means of coercing local gov-
ernments to do their bidding in matters of land use regulation. No
remedy with such a marked potential for abuse should be given serious
consideration as constitutional doctrine.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court said that it had granted certiorari in Hamilton
Bank "to address the question whether federal, state, and local govern-
ments must pay money damages to a landowner whose property alleg-
edly has been 'taken' temporarily by the application of government
regulation." 0 The Court was again unable to reach that question, but
it appears to be undiscouraged by its three unsuccessful attempts to do
so."' The persistence of the issue and the ready acceptance that Justice
land use decisions. The great deference given true legislative action stems from its
high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that an appropriate remedy can
be had at the polls... This rationale is inapposite when applied to a local zoning
body's decision as to the fate of an individual's application for rezone. Most voters
are unaware or unconcerned that fair dealing and consistent treatment may have
been sacrificed in the procedural informality which accompanies action deemed
legislative. Only by recognizing the adjudicative nature of these proceedings and
by establishing standards for their conduct can the rights of the parties directly
affected, whether proponents or opponents of the application, be given protection.
Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410-11, 614 P.2d at 950-51.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 3116.
81. It is by no means certain that a majority of the Court will find the Yolo County
imbroglio to be a suitable vehicle for addressing the regulatory taking issue. From the
pleadings it appears that plaintiffs' land was in the county, was designated on the gen-
eral plan of the county for residential development and was so zoned. While that
designation was in effect, the topsoil was removed and sold under threat of condemna-
tion for use as fill for an expressway. Subsequently the adjacent City of Davis desig-
nated the parcel as an agricultural preserve. When the landowner sought approval of a
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Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent has enjoyed surely give the question
some of the sense of urgency that attended the recently unsettled state
of the application of the federal antitrust laws to the activities of local
government.3 2
In Hamilton Bank the Court was careful to phrase the issue as one
that involves only the consequences of temporary takings, but a resolu-
tion of that aspect of the taking issue will inevitably spill over into
other situations in which taking claims are made, such as diminution of
value cases and moratorium disputes. Awarding compensation for reg-
ulation that "goes too far" is a remedy that would surely damage the
ability of local, state, and federal governments to deal effectively with
the complex of economic, social, and environmental concerns that un-
derlie land use regulation. Given the complexity of the setting in
which land use regulations are applied, there is ground for serious con-
subdivision map that conformed to the county zoning, the city objected and used its
extraterritorial planning authority to block approval. The city also denied access to the
property by refusing to permit streets in the proposed subdivision to be connected to
city streets that abutted the proposed subdivision, refused to provide police and fire
protection, and refused to extend water and sewer lines despite the fact that the prop-
erty had been assessed $75,000 by the sewer district. Plaintiff claims that the absence of
topsoil and an infestation of nematodes precludes agricultural use, partly because the
property is too close to existing residences to allow the use of pesticides to eradicate the
nematodes. The complaint alleges that there is no further local relief available and that
the action of the county on the proposed subdivision map is final. Jurisdictional State-
ment, MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. County of Yolo, Supreme Court Doc. No. 84-
2015, at E-1 to E-25. Although the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, the appel-
late record contains a substantial amount of documentary evidence that would not usu-
ally accompany a case that was decided on the pleadings. See Joint Appendix,
MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. County of Yolo, Supreme Court Doc. No. 84-2015. A
part of this evidence consists of judicial notice of documents that provide a fuller under-
standing of the dispute than would ordinarily be the case. See id. at 95-99 and Report-
ers Transcript of Proceedings in MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. County of Yolo, Doc.
No. 36655, at 100-36. This documentation furnishes a sound basis for the county to
defend on the ground that plat approval was denied for reasons of safety (the proposed
159 lot subdivision has only one access road) and as a matter of development timing.
As to the latter point, the Court previously declined to consider the leading decision
upholding deferral of development as a matter of development timing. See Golden v.
Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972). There is also a companion administrative mandamus case pending in the Cali-
fornia state courts and until there is a final determination in that case, it remains possi-
ble that California law will provide a remedy for the plaintiff by ordering Yolo County
to approve the subdivision map.
82. Each new term brings a collection of appeals and certiorari petitions that raise
the question. There were three such petitions waiting for the Court in the fall of 1985,
one of which was Yolo County. Interview with Gus Bauman, Litigation Counsel for the
National Association of Home Builders.
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cern about the consequences of an inflexible constitutional rule that
would require the payment of compensation in every case in which a
governmental agency oversteps the constitutional limits on land use
regulation. More innovative remedies than simple invalidation may be
necessary and a more receptive judicial attitude toward the legitimate
grievances of landowners may be desirable, but the worst possible solu-
tion would be a rigid constitutional mandate for compensation. Per-
haps the Supreme Court can be persuaded to see it that way too.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/2
